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Abstract The article offers a defense of liberal perfectionism in the light of 
criticism of perfectionist politics stated in Jonathan Quong’s book Liberalism 
without Perfection. It argues against Quong’s claims that perfectionism is 
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Introduction
This paper offers a defense of perfectionist politics within a liberal frame-
work in opposition to Jonathan Quong’s main arguments presented in 
his book Liberalism without Perfection. Quong’s argument is that per-
fectionism is not compatible with a core liberal presupposition of treat-
ing all persons as free and equal because it shows disregard for individ-
ual autonomy, entails paternalism and lacks true political legitimacy. In 
this paper I will address first two issues – autonomy and paternalism. 
My argument will be that perfectionist policies are not only compatible 
with demand for autonomy, but in the context of unequal material dis-
tribution present in liberal societies today, are also welcomed. Also, I 
will argue that policies promoting certain conceptions of good and ways 
of life at the expense of others do not necessarily have to be paternalis-
tic, i.e. rest on an assumption that some citizens don’t know what is in 
their own interest and, therefore, the state is justified in using coercion 
or manipulation to promote their welfare. I will not address the third is-
sue of legitimacy for two reasons. First, the discussion between Quong 
and his critics on that issue has already been published in some detail 
(Chan 2012; Quong 2012b). Second, I believe that the claim of lack of le-
gitimacy of liberal perfectionism in most part rests on accepting argu-
ments about its paternalistic and disrespecting-autonomy character, ar-
guments which I hope to put into question in what follows. 
In short, Quong’s book Liberalism without Perfection is an impressive 
work in a sense that it puts liberal perfectionism to tight scrutiny that 
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has often been lacking in contemporary liberal theory. Additionally, it 
convincingly points out some of the inconsistencies present in theo-
ries of most prominent advocates of perfectionism (most notably Jo-
seph Raz). However, I will argue that it fails in its main mission of show-
ing that liberalism and perfectionism can’t go hand in hand. Liberalism 
without Perfection is persuasive when it comes to warning us about pos-
sible perfectionist hubris that can lead to illiberal policies, but it falls 
short in demonstrating that perfectionist state is inevitably violating ba-
sic liberal ethos by refusing to treat its citizens as free and equal persons. 
Autonomy
The argument that attempts to justify perfectionist policies on the basis 
of autonomy is pretty straightforward. To lead an autonomous life, in-
dividuals need to have valuable options to choose from. If we agree that 
one of the roles state has to play is to provide its citizens with a frame-
work for leading such a life, it makes sense to embrace perfectionism as 
a way of promoting and sustaining valuable options through political 
means1. We can ask ourselves what would happen if the state remained 
neutral and refused to promote and subsidize these valuable options, 
letting individuals themselves pay for those options they find valuable. 
The answer is that many valuable options would either a) disappear or 
b) be accessible only to chosen (richest) few. As Joseph Chan points out, 
“the cost of” disallowing perfectionist state policies “is that people risk 
losing the opportunities to experience valuable goods and worthwhile 
ways of life” (Chan 2000: 34). Take one of Quong’s favorite examples: op-
era. If we remove the government subsidies out of the equation the only 
way the opera could survive would be for it to be commercially sustaina-
ble. To make it profitable either a lot of people have to be ready to pay for 
it (by buying tickets or donating money to opera-loving fund-raisers) or 
a smaller amount of people have to be willing to pay a lot of money for it. 
Both of these scenarios are problematic because nobody could convinc-
ingly argue that most profitable activities are also the most valuable and 
worth maintaining (think Hollywood blockbusters, Dan Brown’s novels 
or Lady Gaga) or that if you are unable to afford certain cultural activi-
ties such as opera it’s only fair that you are deprived of such experiences. 
1  Part of perfectionist agenda can also be negative by banning or discouraging cer-
tain activities (gambling, prostitution, drug use, smoking, high-cholesterol diet, 
etc.), but Quong’s argument mainly deals with positive perfectionism (promoting 
certain activities, practices and goods) rather then with negative perfectionism, so 
in my discussion I will also concentrate on positive perfectionism. 
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This is where perfectionism comes in by using state power to maintain 
those activities that are valuable but not profitable. If we ague that the 
essential element of autonomous life is having a range of valuable ac-
tivities available to us and we are afraid that leaving the survival of these 
options to market logic would lead to many of them dying out or acces-
sible only to the richest among us, then perfectionism seems like a rea-
sonable way to go. “Anti-perfectionism in practice”, Joseph Raz argues, 
“would undermine the chances of survival of many cherished aspects 
of our culture” (Raz 1986: 162). On this account, perfectionism plays a 
corrective role of maintaining those valuable practices and goods that 
would probably not survive in the context of unequal material distribu-
tion and market logic of supply and demand. 
One could argue that if it is the variety of options that autonomous life 
requires then any and every practice is worth saving. To use another 
Quong’s example (this one borrowed from Hurka): why chose to subsi-
dize opera and not mudwrestling? This complaint only makes sense if 
we presuppose a certain skepticism or subjectivism about making value 
judgments when comparing different activities. Who is to say that opera 
is more valuable than mudwrestling? Maybe pushpin is as good as po-
etry. If it’s the variety we need to live autonomously then the best option 
would be to have opera, poetry, mudwrestling and pushpin. However, 
if we can’t maintain all of these activities, which of them should sur-
vive – considering they are all mere preferences that have equal weight 
– should be decided by how many individuals are ready to pursue (and 
pay for) a specific activity. This line argument is not available to Quong 
because he rejects such skepticism or subjectivism.
Some philosophers claim that we can never hold views about human 
flourishing with any degree of certainty or confidence either because 
such matters are too difficult, or more radically, because there are no 
right or wrong answers about human flourishing, only preferences. 
These objections are sometimes pressed against perfectionism in order 
to defend political liberalism, but these arguments are deeply flawed 
(Quong 2011: 33).
As rational and reasonable persons we are able to make valid judgments 
on which options are valuable and which are less valuable or have no 
value at all2. On this point Quong goes along with Raz and acknowledg-
2  Quong is right in pointing out that endorsing skepticism and subjectivism would 
put the whole liberal project of public justification into question. 
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es that it is not the variety of options, but a variety of valuable options 
that matters.
Quong relies on a different strategy to show us what is wrong with in-
voking autonomy in the defense of perfectionism. His main target is 
Joseph Raz and his understanding of autonomy. I want to avoid get-
ting entangled in scholastic-type argument here (interpreting Quong’s 
interpretation of Raz), so I’ll just assume that what Quong has to say 
about Raz is correct. I do, however, want to argue that even if Quong’s 
criticism of Raz is convincing, perfectionism doesn’t stand or fall de-
pending on validity of Raz’s position. One doesn’t need to embrace 
Raz’s understanding of autonomy to show that perfectionism as a set of 
corrective policies makes sense if we want to ensure that citizens have 
valuable options constitutive of autonomous life available to them3. 
The core of Quong’s argument is that autonomy requires that we are 
neither coerced nor manipulated in choosing between different op-
tions. Limiting his discussion on the issue of state subsidies, he argues 
that, by offering financial incentives, the state is manipulating its citi-
zens in choosing some options over others. Quong does acknowledge 
that “mere offers… need not be manipulative” (Quong 2011: 63), but 
state subsidies are not mere offers because what the government is ac-
tually doing is taxing its citizens to pay for the activities – such as opera 
– that citizens are not willing to pay for themselves. These kinds of poli-
cies are government’s attempt to “subject the will of citizens to its own 
perfectionist judgment” (Quong 2011: 66) and are, therefore, manipula-
tive and incompatible with the requirements of autonomy. 
This, I want to argue, is a wrong way to look at what is happening when 
state offers subsidies for activities such as opera. Quong’s view is that 
“the aim of such subsidies is to make the subsidizes activity cheaper 
and thus more attractive to citizens – presumably to get people to en-
gage in the activity when they would not be willing to do so at its mar-
ket cost” (Quong 2011: 61-62) and that “state intentionally acts to alter 
the price of tickets with the aim of changing people’s options” (Quong 
2011: 63). This is a very narrow view of the role of subsides as one of the 
instruments of perfectionist government. The goal of such subsidies is 
not to manipulate people into engaging with the activities they would 
3  Quong admits that different understanding of autonomy than one endorsed by 
Raz would be immune to the his criticism (Quong 2011: 60) and offers himself such 
an alternative notion of autonomy (Quong 2011: 58) 
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otherwise not want to engage, but to maintain and keep open for every-
one valuable activities that are not profitable (or profitable at the price 
that would exclude the majority of citizens from accessing them). Take 
the example of opera again. First, it is highly unlikely that anyone who 
dislikes opera or has not interest in it whatsoever would go to opera just 
because the tickets are now made affordable by government subsidies 
(I have failed numerous times in convincing my friends who think jazz 
is just a noise to join me in going to jazz concerts even when I offered to 
buy them tickets or the concert was free). Second, if the government’s 
main goal was to get people to go to opera the best policy would be to 
buy the tickets and give them out to citizens, not to make the tickets 
cheaper. Also, perfectionist policies are not limited only to subsidies 
that make paying for certain activities cheaper, but also grants which 
are first and foremost directed to maintaining these activities and not 
making them more finically attractive to potential audience (think of 
grants to music schools where opera singers and musicians are trained 
or grants to opera houses where performances are held). 
Certainly, a perfectionist would hope that more people than not will 
decide to engage in valuable activities such as opera once they had a 
chance to experience it (and if enough people decide to do that then op-
era would become profitable, and therefore would not need to by sub-
sidized anymore), but that is not perfectionism’s main goal. It is not go-
ing to the opera that makes our lives more autonomous, but having an 
option of going to the opera. One can live an autonomous life without 
ever going to opera, but living in a society where only available activi-
ties are those that are profitable and many among those available only 
to the richest among us would result in the loss of autonomy for many. 
Paternalism 
The second line of Quong’s attack is based on the argument that per-
fectionism “treats citizens as if they lack the ability to make effective 
choices about their own lives” and, therefore, denies them the moral 
status of free and equal persons. Treating people as if they are unable to 
rationally pursue their own good is clearly paternalistic and if Quong’s 
claim that “paternalism is… (almost) unavoidable part of perfection-
ism” (Quong 2011: 106) is right, then perfectionism is incompatible with 
liberal ethos. The challenge he puts before us is the following: can per-
fectionism avoid paternalism? 
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There are some clear cases where perfectionist non-coercive policies are 
not paternalistic. Wall’s example of nonhumanistic version of perfec-
tionism is one such case. 
Not every kind of noncoercive state perfectionism is paternalistic, 
however. Recall nonhumanistic versions of perfectionism. Those 
who accept these views might favor state support for excellence in 
science and art not because doing so will enable citizens to lead bet-
ter lives, but because the state ought to promote excellence. This de-
fense of noncoercive state paternalism does not presume that some 
citizens are not good at making independent moral decisions about 
how to lead their lives (Wall, internet).
Second example would be corrective perfectionism that I discussed in 
the previous section. If perfectionist government is in the business of 
providing valuable range of options for its citizens, rather than trying 
to coerce or manipulate them in taking these options, then the gov-
ernment is not behaving paternalistically. State subsidies and grants 
serve as a message that, as a political community, these are the practic-
es and goods we find valuable and, therefore, we want them to be avail-
able to all citizens. It is up to each individual citizen to decide which of 
these practices and goods are an important part of his own conception 
of good life. 
Quong’s criticism of perfectionism goes deeper than this. In the Précis 
to the discussion on his book published in Philosophy and Public Issues 
journal, he summarizes his argument in the following way: 
Liberal perfectionists must explain why the state needs to enact per-
fectionist policies. Why not simply give each citizen their fair share 
of resources and let them make their own decisions? The perfection-
ist answer must be, I suggest, that people will not make the right de-
cisions if left to their own devices. But this means that perfection-
ist policies are justified by reference to paternalistic reasoning. The 
perfectionist believes the state must act because she makes a nega-
tive judgement about citizens’ capacities to make effective decisions 
about their own lives. This negative judgement, I claim, makes perfec-
tionist policies presumptively wrongful, since it fails to treat people in 
accordance with their moral status as free and equal (Quong 2012a: 2).
The question “why not simply give each citizen their fair share of re-
sources and let them make their own decisions?” is crucial here, be-
cause it allows Quong to argue that even if corrective perfectionism 
makes sense when we are faced with dramatically unequal distribution 
of resources, in the context where citizens have enough resources to pay 
for those practices and goods they find important, perfectionist policies 
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become unavoidably paternalistic. In Liberalism without Perfection this 
argument is stated even more clearly when Quong talks about non-jus-
tice-based perfectionism:
What this form of perfection must claim, in order to practically dis-
tinguish itself from theories such as Rawls’, is that even if everyone 
has been given their fair share of rights, liberties, opportunities, in-
come, and wealth, further perfectionist policies will be necessary 
(Quong 2011: 85).
By imagining a certain liberal egalitarian utopia in which no one lacks 
resources to pursue his or hers idea of good life, Quong makes the ap-
peal of corrective perfectionism redundant. Corrective perfectionism’s 
role is to correct the injustices that would arise from the fact that many 
people can’t afford valuable goods and practices and to ensure the sur-
vival of those goods and practices that are unprofitable. In the world 
where everyone has enough income and wealth, there is no non-pater-
nalistic way to defended perfectionist policies4. 
This argument is problematic in two ways. First, there is a bit of sleight 
of hand going on: it is not very hard to argue that a certain theoretical 
position – in this case perfectionism – is unconvincing if we can just im-
agine political and social context in which the problem that this theo-
retical position is trying to resolve doesn’t even exist. 
Corrective perfectionism makes sense because there is unequal distri-
bution of income and wealth in liberal democracies. Removing the fact 
of unequal distribution pulls the rug under the justification of perfec-
tionist policies. It’s like a critic of egalitarian liberalism arguing that if 
we all lived in societies where there is perfectly just distribution of re-
sources we would have no need for egalitarianism and this, by itself, is a 
proof enough that egalitarianism is a failed model. Actually, by resort-
ing to “egalitarian utopia” though experiment Quong implicitly admits 
that in current, not ideally egalitarian context of liberal societies, cor-
rective perfectionism is a valid theoretical position. Second, for Quong’s 
argument to work we would have to assume that every rational and rea-
sonable person in our society would have to embrace Rawlsian model 
of distribution as the only just model, otherwise this egalitarian utopia 
would become more oppressive, paternalistic and disrespectful of citi-
zens’ autonomy than any liberal perfectionist state could ever be. Most 
4  Quong talks about five arguments used to defend non-justice based perfection-
ism and shows that they all reveal “liberal perfectionism’s true paternalistic colours” 
(Quong 2011: 86). 
DEFEnDIng PErFEctIOnISmENES KULENOvIć
42
liberals would have a hard time accepting that the price worth paying 
for non-perfectionist state is to dismiss all those who do not accept 
some kind of Rawlsian scheme from the process of public deliberation. 
Nevertheless, it’s worth addressing the question that Quong possess 
through his thought experiment: is there a way to defend perfection-
ist policies in a perfect egalitarian society without resorting to paternal-
ist argument? My answer is yes. Even if we lived in a society where all 
citizens have enough resources to pursue those activities, practices and 
goods that give meaning to their lives, there is still a danger we might 
lose some of these activities, practices and goods if citizens are paying 
for them directly and not through taxes. If everyone is paying only for 
those activities and goods they are participating in or using, that would 
not ensure the survival of many valuable activities and goods. Let me 
give an example. Let’s assume that Amy is big fan of Bruce Springsteen’s 
music and she is ready to pay for tickets for his concerts and for his CDs. 
She doesn’t like to listen to opera, so she never goes to opera concerts or 
buys opera music CDs. However, Amy understands that this is her per-
sonal preference and that opera is equally important to many people, as 
Springsteen’s music is to her. Both Springsteen and opera are valuable, 
but she is ready to pay only to listen to Springsteen. Even if she didn’t 
mind going to the opera sometimes, she doesn’t have time to go because 
time is a limited resource and there is only limited amount of valuable 
activities and goods that we can invest ourselves in5. To record or enjoy 
first-rate opera in concerts is more or equally expensive as for Spring-
steen to record or perform, so more or equal amount of resources are 
necessary to sustain opera as it is to sustain Springsteen’s music. Un-
fortunately, there are much less fans of opera than there are of Spring-
steen, so unless we presuppose a society where material resources are 
not only equally distributed, but also unlimited, it is fair to assume that 
if not enough people are willing to pay for opera concert tickets or CDs, 
opera will die out. Even in egalitarian utopia, valuable practices, activi-
ties and goods would disappear. Possible counter-argument, suggested 
by Quong himself6, is that opera fans could appeal to Springsteen fans 
like Amy who are not willing to listen to opera, but accept it as a valuable 
practice, to donate money so that opera could survive. This would put 
5  Unless we take Quong’s though experiment one step further and assume that in 
our egalitarian utopia time is an unlimited resource, but then we are not doing po-
litical theory anymore, but writing science fiction. 
6  This counter-argument was proposed by Quong during our discussion at the sym-
posium dedicated to his book held at the University of Rijeka on 23rd of June, 2012. 
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the survival of non-profitable practices not only at the mercy of possible 
donators, but also entrepreneurial skills of fans of these non-profitable 
activities. If opera fans in one generation are not very skilled at collect-
ing money from non-opera fans, future generations of possible opera-
lovers will never have chance to experience opera performed live. 
There is, however, a deeper issue at stake. When discussing the free-
rider problem in relation to public goods Quong points out that perfec-
tionists have a valid claim in arguing that although we all have interest 
in enjoying public gods, it is also in our selfish interest to benefit from 
these goods without paying for them. If everyone reasons this was, no-
body will want to pay for public goods, so this is where the state should 
step in. The problem is, Quong argues, that “subsidies usually called 
for by perfectionist almost never involve genuine public goods” (Quong 
2011: 89). Valuable goods that perfectionist most often want to subsidize 
– goods like “performance art, art galleries, public parks, works of litera-
ture, sights of cultural significance, educational programs for adults, and 
athletic events” – are not genuine public goods because “they lack the 
essential feature of non-excludability” (Quong 2011: 89). Let us take the 
example of public funding of parks. Parks do not qualify as strictly pub-
lic good: they are neither non-excludable (one can put a fence around 
the park and charge the admission at the gate), nor non-rival (use of 
park reduces its use for others)7. From Quong’s perspective, this means 
that perfectionist argument about need for public funding of parks is 
misguided. There is no justifiable perfectionist reason why parks should 
be funded from taxes because those who find parks as important goods 
can pay for them at the entrance8. In economic terms, Quong’s argu-
ment makes sense: let those who want to enjoy certain goods (in this 
case, walks in the park) pay for them without taking money away from 
those who do not want to enjoy these goods or are indifferent to them. 
I want to argue that there is more to goods such as parks than just their 
economic value. When the government uses taxes to pay for upkeep 
of parks it is doing so in the name of its citizens. Public funding is a 
way of saying that citizens as equal members of political community 
are ready to support certain goods – performance art, art galleries, pub-
lic parks, works of literature, sights of cultural significance, educational 
7  Fresh air produced by the trees from the park is non-excludable and non-rival, 
but we can leave that aside for now. 
8  Of course, fencing off parks and guarding them from non-paying trespassers 
would make visits to the parks mush more expensive for individual visitors then if 
everyone paid taxes and they were left open to everyone. 
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programs for adults, and athletic events – that are not public goods in 
strict economic terms, but are common goods that should be available 
to everyone and immune to market logic of profit. In Quong’s egalitar-
ian utopia where everyone has enough resources to pay for whatever 
they deem important for living a good life, why do we need a state to tell 
us what to pay for? The answer is that public funding also plays a sym-
bolic role by removing certain goods from the market and transforming 
them into common goods. Even if everyone could afford these goods, 
the fact that we pay for them as citizens through taxes and not as indi-
vidual consumers has an important political significance. By making 
people pay individually at the entrance to the park we are turning citi-
zens into consumers and common goods into market goods9. This leads 
to impoverished view of politics that eliminates the ideal of true citizen 
– citoyen – participating in a common political project with his fellow 
citizens and leaves us only with bearers of individual rights as consum-
ers – bourgeois – satisfying their personal preferences. It also leads to 
impoverished view of the state where its role is nothing more than to 
provide fair and equal playing field for each consumer to satisfy his or 
her needs. State is no longer seen as a guardian of common goods, but a 
company that charges us for the services it provides. If the state is driven 
solely by market logic there is no reason why it should sustain the provi-
sion of those services that not enough people are ready to pay for or why 
it shouldn’t privatize all these services. 
Quong’s egalitarian state is more sophisticated then that because the 
government would also have a role of making sure that through fair dis-
tribution everyone is able to pay for activities and good they find valua-
ble. Still, this doesn’t change the fact that in non-perfectionist state citi-
zens are mere consumers voicing their individual preferences through 
their (now more or less equal) purchasing power. The appeal of perfec-
tionist state is that it invites its citizens to publicly debate which good 
should be labeled as common goods and to offer public justification 
why they should not be privately funded, but supported through taxes. 
This ideal is a far cry from coercing or manipulating citizens into pay-
ing taxes for something – predetermined common goods designated as 
such by political and cultural elites – they would otherwise never spend 
money on.
9  For criticism of substituting social goods for market goods from the economic 
perspective, see: Ariely 2008, Ch. 4. For more comprehensive criticism of allowing 
market mechanisms to be the sole determining factor of maintaining practices, ac-
tivities and goods, see: Sandel 2012. 
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Conclusion
Jonathan Quong in his book Liberalism without Perfection offers a well-
argued criticism of liberal perfectionist project. Where it succeeds is in 
showing us that there always looming danger that perfectionist state 
might violate the liberal ethos by disregarding individual autonomy and 
turning paternalistic. It fails, however, in its main argument that liber-
al perfectionism is a contradiction in terms. One can consistently, I’ve 
tried to argue, be both liberal and perfectionist. In the context of exist-
ing liberal societies with their growing social inequalities, it would be 
self-defeating for liberals to abandon perfectionist policies. That would 
only results in many valuable practices, activities and goods dying out or 
surviving at the cost of being available only to the richest few. But even 
in the context of egalitarian utopia where everyone is given their fair 
share of rights, liberties, opportunities, income, and wealth we would 
still have need for perfectionist intervention into the market. First, 
such interventions would ensure the survival of many valuable, but less 
popular goods for both this and for future generations. Second, perfec-
tionist state allows us to be more than just consumers, it ensures the 
framework within which we act as true citizens involved in the common 
project of determining what practices, activities and goods are valua-
ble enough to threat them as common goods that are worth sustaining. 
There is a neat trick that political theorists can apply to any theoretical 
model they are advocating: following John Stuart Mill we can ask our-
selves what would happen if all the elements of out theoretical model 
came to life. In this particular case, the question is how many liber-
als would support Quong’s anti-perfectionist model coming to life? My 
hunch is that the answer would be: not many.
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Enes Kulenović
U odbranu perfekcionizma: kritika Kvongovog Liberalizma bez savršenstva
Apstrakt
Članak nudi odbranu liberalnog perfekcionizma u svetlu kritike perfekci-
onističkih politika koju je izneo Džonatan Kvong u svojoj knjizi Liberali-
sm without Perfection. Članak kritički pristupa Kvongovim tvrdnjama da je 
perfekcionizam nekompaktibilan sa zahtevima za poštovanje autonomije 
pojedinca i za nepaternalizmom kao uslovima liberalnog stremljenja da se 
sve osobe tretiraju kao slobodne i jednake. 
Ključne reči: Quong, perfekcionizam, autonomija, paternalizam, liberalizam.
